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Challenges in Implementing Keynesian and Classical Economic Policies

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One practical limitation of Keynesian economics is the challenge of implementing active economic policy quickly. Another is that the classical or Neoclassical model suggests allowing the economy to self-correct in the long run, but recessions may last a very long time.

The Limitations of Keynesian and Classical Economics

Keynesian and Classical economic models offer contrasting approaches to managing economic downturns and fostering long-term stability. Keynesian economics advocates for active government intervention, particularly during recessions, aiming to stabilize employment and output. However, the practical limitation lies in the timely implementation of these policies, which can be challenging in urgent economic scenarios. Conversely, Classical or Neoclassical models argue that economies should be allowed to self-correct without intervention, emphasizing market efficiency over time. Yet, this approach risks prolonged recessions, leaving the economy vulnerable to sustained periods of low growth. This blog post delves into these limitations, evaluates the severity of each, and explores real-world examples to illuminate the practical consequences of these theoretical challenges.

Timeliness in Policy Implementation of Keynesian Economics

The Keynesian model’s primary limitation involves the difficulty of enacting fiscal and monetary policies quickly enough to address economic fluctuations effectively. Keynesian economics posits that governments can stabilize an economy by increasing spending or reducing taxes during downturns. However, designing, approving, and executing these policies often involves lengthy bureaucratic procedures, creating delays that may render the interventions less effective.

One striking example is the 2008 financial crisis, during which many governments implemented stimulus packages to offset plummeting consumer demand and rising unemployment. In the United States, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was signed into law in 2009, aiming to stimulate the economy by injecting funds into public projects, infrastructure, and tax credits. While this policy eventually supported recovery, the delays in enacting it led to continued economic pain for millions before tangible improvements became visible. Such cases highlight how delays can exacerbate recessions, undermining the primary intent of Keynesian policies.

Bureaucratic and Political Hurdles

A critical reason for delays in implementing Keynesian policies lies in bureaucratic and political challenges. Government spending bills, such as those funding Keynesian-style stimulus programs, must go through multiple legislative stages, including proposal, negotiation, voting, and signing. Each phase involves lengthy discussions and potential modifications, which can result in policy inefficacies and delays.

Political polarization adds to these delays, as opposing parties may debate the necessity, scope, or specific allocations within stimulus packages. In cases where different parties control government branches, reaching a consensus on spending policies becomes even more challenging. These obstacles not only delay but also dilute the effectiveness of Keynesian interventions. For instance, in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. Congress took months to negotiate and pass the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, even as businesses and households faced immediate financial hardship.

Economic Forecasting Limitations

Accurately forecasting economic downturns is essential for implementing Keynesian policies at the most effective moment. However, predicting recessions and their potential impacts is notoriously tricky, leading to policies that either arrive too late or too early. If governments enact interventions before a downturn fully manifests, they risk increasing debt without achieving the desired economic boost. Conversely, if they wait too long, they may face a more entrenched recession that requires more substantial intervention.

For example, in the early 2000s, the U.S. government responded to a minor economic slowdown with aggressive interest rate cuts and tax reductions to prevent a recession. However, this early intervention fueled an overheated housing market, eventually bursting the housing bubble in 2008. This incident illustrates how poorly timed interventions, even with Keynesian intentions, can unintentionally contribute to economic instability.

Classical Economics and Self-Correction

A Long-Term Approach with Short-Term Costs

Classical or Neoclassical economics advocates for minimal intervention, emphasizing the economy’s capacity to self-correct over time. According to this model, government interference disrupts natural market adjustments, ultimately leading to inefficiencies. However, a significant limitation of this approach is that recessions can become prolonged, affecting livelihoods, businesses, and overall economic well-being.

During the Great Depression, for instance, policymakers initially adopted a Classical approach, believing that the economy would recover naturally. The resulting lack of intervention led to an extended period of unemployment and decreased output, delaying recovery for years. Economies began to stabilise and recover when governments began implementing Keynesian policies, focusing on job creation and public spending. This historical example underscores the potential risks of relying solely on market self-correction, particularly in severe economic downturns.

Severity of Economic Hardship and the Self-Correction Model

The self-correction model often proves especially painful for lower-income households, who may not have the resources to withstand prolonged unemployment or decreased wages. This model assumes that the labour market will eventually reach equilibrium, but it fails to account for the human cost of waiting for such an adjustment. High unemployment levels can lead to increased poverty, homelessness, and reduced access to essential services, with long-lasting impacts on society.

For instance, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, several European countries initially adopted austerity measures, cutting government spending and welfare programs to reduce debt. These policies, grounded in Classical economics, led to severe social consequences, with unemployment reaching unprecedented levels in Greece and Spain. This approach delayed recovery, as many citizens endured years of economic hardship before growth resumed. These cases illustrate that while self-correction may stabilize markets eventually, it can impose severe and lasting hardships on the population.

A Fundamental Weakness in the Classical Model

Classical economics assumes perfect market conditions where supply and demand naturally balance without intervention. However, real-world markets exhibit imperfections that challenge this assumption. Factors such as price stickiness, monopolistic practices, and imperfect information prevent economies from achieving equilibrium without intervention. When prices fail to adjust promptly, unemployment may remain high, and output may stay below potential for extended periods.

An example of market imperfection is the labour market’s wage rigidity. Employers may hesitate to reduce wages during recessions, fearing reduced morale and productivity. As a result, high wages can prolong unemployment, contradicting the Classical model’s assumption that labour markets will naturally adjust to restore employment. In such cases, relying on self-correction can worsen and prolong recessions, necessitating policy interventions to restore balance.

Comparing the Practical Implications of Keynesian and Classical Models

When assessing the practical implications of Keynesian and Classical models, it becomes evident that each carries distinct limitations with severe consequences. Though effective in theory, Keynesian economics struggles with the challenge of timely implementation, limiting its immediate impact during crises. Conversely, the Classical model’s reliance on self-correction may stabilize the economy in the long term but often imposes harsh short-term costs, especially on vulnerable populations.

Choosing these models involves weighing the trade-offs between rapid intervention and long-term stability. For policymakers, understanding these limitations underscores the importance of a flexible approach considering immediate and enduring societal impacts.

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Conclusion: practical limitation of Keynesian economics and Classical Economic Policies

The practical limitation of Keynesian economics is significant even though Keynesian and classical economic models offer valuable insights. Keynesian economics excels in promoting stability during downturns but suffers from delays due to bureaucratic processes and forecasting challenges. While appealing in its simplicity, the classical approach often fails to address the immediate needs of individuals affected by prolonged recessions. As economic environments grow increasingly complex, modern policymakers should consider a balanced approach that leverages both models’ strengths to promote financial resilience.

In practice, hybrid policies that combine Keynesian intervention with Classical principles of market self-regulation may offer a more adaptable solution. Such an approach allows for timely responses to economic crises while maintaining an awareness of long-term impacts. By acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of each model, economists and policymakers can better navigate the complexities of modern economies, fostering growth, stability, and social well-being.

Recommendations for further reading:

References for practical limitation of Keynesian economics vs. Classical Economics

  • Blanchard, O., Dell’Ariccia, G., & Mauro, P. (2010). “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy.” IMF Staff Position Note.
  • Keynes, J. M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Macmillan.
  • Mankiw, N. G. (2009). Principles of Economics. South-Western Cengage Learning.
  • Romer, C. D. (1993). “The Nation in Depression.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(2), 19–39.
  • Taylor, J. B. (2009). “The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong.” NBER Working Paper Series.

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